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Abstract
In the digital age, the practical possibility of 
engaging inequalities as political problems, 
that is, as problems related to the competition 
for the control over the distribution of values 
in society, is undermined by the digital invis-
ibility of reality 
In the current state of affairs, the digi-
talization of society reflects the influence of 
capitalist interpellation and brings about the 
invisibility of the real. The invisibility of the 
real through capitalist digitalization, in turn, 
conflates digitization and digitalization sub-
ordinating the latter to the former. Construed 
as a process inspired by technological ration-
ality, capitalist digitalization undermines the 
possibility of mobilizing knowledge and legit-
imizing practices in support of the interpreta-
tion of invisibilities in relation to inequalities 
and injustice. 
In line with the critical perspective of An-
drew Feenberg and others, my approach is 
that the influence of capitalism in the digital 
age results from an epistemic appropriation of 
a technological development. This appropria-
tion is the source of invisibilities that support 
inequalities and ultimately injustices that can 
and should be opposed. Leading on from this, 
my point is that opposition to this influence 
depends on the possibility of establishing al-
ternative epistemic grounds and the formula-
tion of alternative interpellations for the pro-
duction of digital subjectivity. 
To foster the normative agenda of critical 
theory, I discuss this possibility in terms of 
the ‘dialectics of the real’, the re-politicization 
of the social construction of reality in the dig-
ital age and the role of critical media literacy.
Keywords: Interpellation, digitization, digitalization, dialectics of the real, 
social construction of reality, capitalism
Invisibilidade, Desigualdade e Dialética 
do Real na Era Digital
Resumo
Na era digital, a possibilidade prática de 
engajar desigualdades como problemas polí-
ticos, ou seja, como problemas relacionados 
com a competição pelo controle da distribui-
ção de valores na sociedade, é prejudicada 
pela invisibilidade digital da realidade.
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IntRoDuctIon
The main point of this paper is that the capitalist appropriation of digital affor-
dances produces invisibilities, and in particular the ‘invisibility of the real’, whose 
fundamental effect is to preserve the hegemony of capitalism in the present and to 
project it into the future. In order to resist this hegemony and re-appropriate the 
emancipative potential of digital technology, it is important to re-establish the vis-
ibility of the real and the political dimension of the social construction of the real. 
In other words, we need to restore the possibility of thinking about technological 
development, relations of power, social change and the future outside the influence 
of capitalist ideology.
My starting point is that communication, visibility and inequalities are connected 
and that every form of communication reveals something and hides something else. 
This connection thus establishes different patterns of the visibility and invisibility of 
equalities and inequalities: different codes, rules, routines, conventions, practices that 
No atual estado de coisas, a digitalização 
da sociedade reflete a influência da interpe-
lação capitalista e provoca a invisibilidade do 
real. A invisibilidade do real através da digi-
talização capitalista, por sua vez, confunde 
digitação e digitalização, subordinando esta 
última à primeira. Construída como um pro-
cesso inspirado na racionalidade tecnológica, 
a digitalização capitalista compromete a pos-
sibilidade de mobilizar conhecimentos e le-
gitimar práticas de apoio à interpretação das 
invisibilidades em relação a desigualdades e 
injustiças.
De acordo com a perspectiva crítica de 
Andrew Feenberg e outros, a minha aborda-
gem é que a influência do capitalismo na era 
digital resulta de uma apropriação epistémi-
ca de um desenvolvimento tecnológico. Esta 
apropriação é a fonte de invisibilidades que 
apoiam desigualdades e, por fim, injustiças 
que podem e devem ser combatidas. Par-
tindo disso, o meu ponto é que a oposição 
a essa influência depende da possibilidade 
de estabelecer fundamentos epistémicos al-
ternativos e da formulação de interpelações 
alternativas para a produção da subjetivida-
de digital.
Para promover a agenda normativa da te-
oria crítica, discuto essa possibilidade em ter-
mos da ‘dialética do real’, da repolitização da 
construção social da realidade na era digital e 
do papel da literacia mediática crítica.
Palavras-chave: Interpelação, digitação, digitalização, dialética do real, 
construção social da realidade, capitalismo
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ultimately determine which difference is relevant and which is not, which one can or 
cannot be ignored. 
The concept of (in)visibility here is taken in its broader meaning or semantic connota-
tion, which includes the ideas of attention or prominence and of awareness or knowledge. 
The concept of inequality combines ‘difference’ with ‘power’ or, more precisely, 
the distribution of differences with the distribution (or hierarchy) of power. The as-
sociation between inequalities and injustice is based on implicit ideas concerning 
the distribution of differences, the distribution of power and the (il)legitimacy of the 
association between the two. 
These definitions/distinctions are important because in every society only some 
differences have the social significance of inequalities and only some inequalities are 
construed as injustice. What differences are treated as injustice and how ultimately 
depends on ideological interpellation. This notion was originally coined by Louis 
Althusser to discuss how capitalist ideology manipulates people into compliance 
with what is ultimately a system of production based on exploitation. For Althusser, 
ideology works by interpellating individuals as subjects (1971/2008, pp. 44-51) and 
the subjects so constituted by ideological interpellation make ideology possible. This 
process of ‘double constitution’ may seem quite implausible and difficult to under-
stand unless one considers that, according to Althusser: 
Ideology is a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their 
real conditions of existence (p. 36) (My italic).
For our discussion, this interpretation of ideology and interpellation has at least two 
implications, on analytical and epistemic grounds. First, the role of communication tech-
nology in society is subordinated to that of ideology and of the ideological role of other 
institutions in society. In a critical perspective, it is important to point out that patterns of 
(in)visibility and (in)equality are not ‘caused’ by some intrinsic qualities of communica-
tion technology. As Andrew Feenberg convincingly argues in his description of a critical 
theory of technology, technology alone is not responsible for the effects of technology on 
the distribution of power or inequalities in society. According to Feenberg,
technologies are not separate from society but are adapted to specific social 
and political systems. Technologies are thus not neutral tools, because they are 
implicated in the socio-political order they serve and contribute to shaping, nor 
26 INTERAÇÕES: SOCIEDADE E AS NOVAS MODERNIDADES 34
Invisibility, Inequality and the Dialectics  of the Real in the Digital Age
can they be characterized by a singular “essence of technology” because they 
evolve historically along with other aspects of society. Just as institutions, laws 
and customs can be changed by human action, so can technological systems. 
(Feenberg, 2009, p. 146)
If the socio-political order served by the information revolution and digitalization 
is that of Western, post-industrial, ‘mature’ or global capitalism, as has been argued 
at least since the 1980s (Schiller, 1980; Inayatullah, 1998), the question to ask is then 
not what does digital technology do but how does capitalist technological discourse 
legitimizes patterns of (in)visibility and (in)equality that contribute to the legitimiza-
tion of capitalist socio-political order (Fisher, 2010): what is revealed, what is hidden, 
and how invisibilities relate to injustice? 
Second, since ‘ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to 
their real conditions of existence’ (Althusser, 1971/2008, p. 36), the role of commu-
nication technology becomes crucial: well beyond the mere communication of in-
formation and, more fundamentally, in the production of the (ideological) repre-
sentation of reality. In this perspective, one can appreciate the distinctive feature of 
the digital age. As I argue in the rest of this paper, the patterns of (in)visibility, (in)
equality and (in)justice associated with the digital age are unique to the extent that 
they involve what I summarize as ‘the invisibility of the real’.  
DIgItAl InvIsIbIlItIEs
Patterns of (in)visibility and (in)equalities can be described in relation to at least 
three main dimensions: the individual, social and epistemic dimensions. To antici-
pate the main points of my argument, the distinctive, and in some respects more 
disturbing, aspects of the digital age pertain to the epistemic dimension, or the ‘in-
visibility of the real’. This aspect, which concerns the possibility and accessibility of 
shared truths, has crucial political implications: the invisibility of the real dissolves 
the possibility of linking inequality with injustice, preserving both but undermining 
collective action against the conditions through which the former produces the latter. 
To address this problem, in the concluding section I describe an epistemic standpoint 
I call ‘the dialectics of the real’. Before that, however, I discuss ‘digital invisibilities’ 




Quite intuitively, the digital age makes invisible those people who do not have ac-
cess to digital technology or who have access to it but not the material and immaterial 
resources (e.g. skills, time, money, etc.) to compete for visibility with the new digital 
elites (van DijK, 2012). The relevant debate here is the one about the ‘digital divide’ and 
relevant inequalities associated with this divide (see e.g. (Rooksby & Weckert, 2007)).
Perhaps less intuitively, however, the digital age is associated with important invis-
ibilities in the production of subjectivity: a process increasingly dependent on a tech-
nological infrastructure almost completely owned by corporations and instrumental 
to their interests. The mediated production of subjectivity reveals the influence of 
the social in the constitution of the self but hides the role of corporate ideology and 
norms in the process. 
Discussing the alleged affordances of digital technology in enabling the formation 
of subjectivities, for example, Rob Cover (2016) argues that the nature or direction of 
these affordances is fundamentally influenced by ‘the encroachment of a neoliberal 
commodification of digital activities’ (p. xix). As a result, 
the contemporary subject of digital media may be one who is engaged forcefully 
in interactive behavior, innovative creativity, sharing, and participation, but the 
basic requirement to participate is to be a subject who conforms vehemently to 
an individualized stylization of performativity. (p. 264)
In his research on social media, Christian Fuchs has exposed ‘the double logic of com-
modification and ideology that shapes corporate social media’ which, behind the ‘social’, 
hides ‘capital accumulation… based on user data commodification, the unpaid labour of 
Internet users, targeted advertising and economic surveillance’ (Fuchs, 2014, p. 342).
Discussing the role of digital technology in the key domain of education, Karen A. 
Ferneding argues that technocentric discourse in education technology supports the 
influence of neoliberalism in education while marginalizing issues of social justice 
and alternative visions of social order (Ferneding, 2003). 
In the conditions of the digital age, therefore, the production of subjectivities 
through mediated communication, e.g. in education, social media, etc. depends on 
a preliminary and necessary compliance with rules ultimately established to serve 
corporate interests and ideology.
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The relevant invisibility here is not that of people or inequalities but the invis-
ibility of the influence of the digital infrastructure and ideological interpellation in 
the formation of (digital) subjectivities. What remains hidden here is the funda-
mental fact that the social production of the self in the digital age is influenced by 
a communicative infrastructure that interpellates its users as ideological subjects 
(e.g. ‘prosumers’) and, to recall Althusser, reproduces capitalism as the dominant 
‘representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions 
of existence’ (supra).
This representation is obviously manipulative since, for example, it formally en-
dorses the centrality of the individual and the production of autonomous subjec-
tivities but hides the conformist influences of digital socialization and detrimental 
effects such as digital addiction, isolation, etc. especially among younger generations. 
Similarly, while it establishes the hybrid social character of the ‘prosumer’, it hides the 
decline of the citizen.
The social dimension
From the perspective of interpellation, the most interesting aspect of digitaliza-
tion is the intrinsic ambivalence of the patterns of social visibility and invisibility. 
In the digital age, the communicative production of the social is a process that feeds 
very opposite representations of the ‘imaginary relationship between the individual 
and its conditions of existence’.
On the one hand, the emphasis on information, information flows and the net-
work support the ‘computopia’ (Masuda, 1981) of the ‘information society’, a state of 
affairs characterized, among other things, by ‘freedom of decisions’ and ‘equality of 
opportunities’, and, more broadly, one in which class differences, inequalities, strug-
gle and exploitation have disappeared as a result of mere technological progress. On 
the other hand, the same technological infrastructure generates phenomena such as 
‘filter bubbles’ (Pariser, 2011) and ‘eco chambers’ (Flaxman, et al., 2016) whose func-
tion is to give expression to voices of more or less radical dissent against the socio-
political order served by the digital utopia.
The remarkable aspect is that the repression of social conflict feeds the radicalization 
but also the digital isolation of dissidence in a vicious circle that ultimately disrupts the 
social production of the social. 
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The disruptive potential of this ambivalence in the production of the social is not 
a recent discovery. Since the early stage of the information revolution, for example, 
scholars have warned against the risk of the emphasis on information and its delivery 
side-lining or neglecting issues of equitable distribution of the benefits associated 
with the development of information systems (Machlup, 1962; Machlup, 1980-84). 
Early critics of the information society expressed their scepticism and argued that 
capitalist interests are bound to prevail because the political economy of the informa-
tion society was, and still is, in corporate hands (Schiller, 1981) and fundamentally 
subservient to corporate ideology (Shiller, 1999).
More recently, and following Roland Barthes (Barthes, 1957/2000), Vincent 
Mosco, argued that the myth of cyberspace is a form of ‘depoliticized speech’ that 
can ‘purify social relations by eliminating the tensions and conflicts that animate the 
political life of a community’ (Mosco, 2004, p. 31). In particular, the myth of the In-
formation Age denies history and ‘transcends politics because it makes power avail-
able to everyone and in great abundance. The defining characteristic of politics, the 
struggle over the scarce resource of power, is eliminated. In this respect, myths create 
a new history, a new time, by denying history (Mosco, 2004, p. 35). 
Discussing the risks related to the current stage in the evolution of the informa-
tion society, Alistair S. Duff (2012) argues that it is necessary to acknowledge and to 
address ‘the normative crisis of the information society’ (p. 7) and to raise the prob-
lem of ‘information inequality’s significance’ (p. 14).
For the purposes of our discussion, the contributions of these and other authors 
give grounds to the idea that the patterns of visibility and invisibility related to the 
production of the real in the digital age have fundamentally ambivalent effects. While 
enforcing representations of the social imaginary that support the computational 
utopia on the one hand, they incite or feed the radicalization but also the isolation of 
dissidence on the other.
On more political grounds, this state of affairs has at least two implications worth 
mentioning. First, the social produced by this pattern of visibility/invisibility is an am-
bivalent creature: the routine announcement of ‘revolutionary’ change, hides continuity 
in the structure of power and inequalities; the celebration of ICT democratic poten-
tial is an incitation to forget the fact that technology alone cannot change relations of 
power (Lyon, 1986); the emphasis on digital ‘enabling potential’ hides growing socio-
economic inequalities, the growing role and influence of surveillance and the erosion of 
individual privacy by both state and corporate actors (Allmer, 2015) (Fuchs, 2014). In 
30 INTERAÇÕES: SOCIEDADE E AS NOVAS MODERNIDADES 34
Invisibility, Inequality and the Dialectics  of the Real in the Digital Age
other words, this is a social in which the focus on the ‘power’ of connectivity marginal-
izes formidable problems concerning the grounds of legitimation of this power, hence 
blurring the distinction between its legitimate and illegitimate uses. 
Second, these ambivalent patterns of visibility/invisibility in the digital produc-
tion of the social, have implications for social change. For all practical purposes, this 
ambivalence protects the capitalist social order from dissidence but undermines the 
legitimization of democratic political regimes by facilitating the repression and isola-
tion of dissidence in forms and content (organizations, rhetorics, propaganda, activ-
ism, protest, etc.) too often incompatible with the form and content of democratic 
politics. In other words, online activism does not undermine capitalist interpellation, 
but seems an excellent breeding ground for radical ideas and movements excluded 
from more traditional institutions (media, parliaments, political parties, etc.) of dem-
ocratic regimes.
It is important to keep in mind that these patterns of visibility/invisibility, and 
the disruptive communicative effects on the democratic regimes, are not intrinsic 
to ICT but result from the process of interpellation I described above: the specific 
‘representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence’ associated with ‘the free market’ utopia.  
The most distinctive of the invisibilities of the digital age, however, is the ‘invis-
ibility of the real’.
The epistemic dimension: the invisibility of the real
In philosophical discourse, the ‘real’ describes what is true, authentic and which, 
therefore, constitutes ‘reality’ as the ground for the possibility of truth, knowledge 
and justice, communication and organized, collective action. If we take visibility to 
mean attention or prominence, awareness or knowledge, to argue for the invisibility 
of real in the digital age means to suggest that some identifiable set of conditions 
commonly referred to as the ‘digital age’ contributes to make this common ground 
both less accessible and less relevant.  
Here I would like to suggest that this ‘invisibility of the real’ is the outcome of an 
ideological appropriation of the two fundamental ‘turns’ I have discussed more at 
length elsewhere: the epistemic turn of social constructionism in the 1960s and the 
‘digital turn’ in ICT at around the turn of the millennium (Stocchetti, 2017). 
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The ideological appropriation of an epistemic formulation is in essence a herme-
neutic process by which the purposes of the formulation are separated from its con-
ceptual tools and substituted with other purposes. This possibility exists because, put 
simply, despite the fact that truth and justice are values equally relevant in epistemic 
practices, the ways in which we learn what is true or false are different from the ways in 
which we establish what is right or wrong. The appropriation of the constructivist ‘turn’ 
by capitalist ideology was motivated by the fact that the new epistemic brought about 
the politicization of the real, and the ensuing consideration that, if reality was socially 
constructed especially through communicative practices, the control of reality was a 
possibility based on the control of these practices (Stocchetti, 2017). In other words, the 
emancipative purposes inspiring the idea that ‘reality is what we make of it’ were substi-
tuted with the purpose of preserving capitalism by ‘making reality what we need of it’. 
The ideological appropriation of the affordances of the ‘digital turn’ was brought 
about through the conceptual confusion between the double process of digitization 
and digitalization, and by the subordination of the latter to the former. Digitization 
is a process of representation through binary codification and de-codification of the 
sensorial aspects of the social world. Digitalization is the process describing the social 
changes associated with digitization. But while digitization is a process associated 
with and in relevant measure controlled by the social forces involved in technological 
development, digitalization is a process of social change involving a wider range of 
forces, interests, values, visions, etc. Most importantly, digitalization involves norma-
tive questions (Duff, 2012). 
Thus, the ideological appropriation of the ‘digital turn’ occurred through the con-
fusion between these two processes and the subversion of the relation between them: 
putting the development of digital tool, or digitization, before the development of 
(digital) ends, or digitalization. Once digitization (a technological or instrumental 
process) is confused with digitalization (a social process), and the latter is subordi-
nated to the former, the process of social change is confined within the narrow terms 
of technocentrism and, ultimately, inscribed within the ideological project of neolib-
eral globalization. 
For all its simplicity, the slogan ‘the virtual is the new real’ effectively expresses 
the basic idea that the source of social change has moved from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ 
real: from the domain of politics and the competition for the control over the dis-
tribution of values in society, to the domain of technological development, network 
management and digital surveillance. This slogan and its broad popular acceptance 
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are perhaps the most convincing evidence that the apprehensions voiced by at least 
three generations of critical scholars, from Herbert Marcuse to Jean Baudrillard and 
Andrew Feenberg, are not unfounded.
DIgItIZAtIon AnD Its subvERsIon: 
tHE PolItIcs oF tHE REAl 
The invisibility of the real is an epistemic move with political consequences. It is a 
move made possible by epistemic and technological innovations and by the relative 
positioning of social forces in condition to take advantage of them while others could 
not. 
The idea that reality is socially constructed establishes reality as a stake in a politi-
cal competition. To the extent that the construction of reality depends on communi-
cative practices, it also makes the control of communication technology a strategic 
resource.
As James Carey noted:
Reality is, above all, a scarce resource. Like any scarce resource it is there to be 
struggled over, allocated to various purposes and projects, endowed with given 
meanings and potential, spent and conserved, rationalized and distributed. The 
fundamental form of power is the power to define, allocate, and display this 
resource. Once the blank canvas of the world is portrayed and featured, it is also 
pre-empted and restricted. Therefore, the site where artists paint, writers write, 
speakers speak, film makers film, broadcasters broadcast is simultaneously the 
site of social conflict over the real. It is not a conflict over ideas as disembodied 
forces. It is not a conflict over technology. It is not a conflict over social relations. 
It is a conflict over the simultaneous codetermination of ideas, technique, and 
social relations. It is above all a conflict not over the effects of communication 
but of the acts and practices that are themselves the effects. (Carey, 1988, p. 87)
In this competition, the digital infrastructure is a formidable resource for those 
who can control it. It not only increases the speed and quantity of information about 
reality but, in order to do so, it requires and fosters the transformation of reality 
itself. The digitization of reality does not merely represent reality: it creates a new 
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reality that, by definition, is completely under the control of its infrastructure. In this 
new reality, the production of knowledge combines with the legitimization of power 
through what Jean-François Lyotard called ‘performativity’ or ‘the best possible in-
put/output equation’ (Lyotard, 1979/1982, p. 48) and facilitates the achievement of 
goals by making them ‘invisible’ or beyond the reach of critical evaluation. 
Because digitization is so effectively instrumental, digitalization, or the adaptation 
of the social world (practices, institutions, relationships, etc.) to the requirements of 
digitization, seems inevitable. This inevitability is expressed by a variety of slogans 
that, while reflecting, promoting and rejuvenating technological myths, are endorsed 
with the socio-political influence of actors that more or less consciously seek to gain 
control of the communicative construction of reality. 
The invisibilities associated with this move support new structures of inequalities, 
illegitimate distribution of power and, therefore, injustice. From a critical perspec-
tive, however, the fundamental task is not to list these invisibilities but to look deeper 
into the invisibility of the real: to understand the nature of this process, the conditions 
that make it possible, the possible implications in terms of power and legitimacy, the 
nature of the risks, challenges and opportunities associated with them and, in line 
with the normative ambitions of critical theory, to delineate plausible interventions 
to resist oppressive consequences and support the opportunities for emancipation.
Once the social world is re-constructed within a reality fully inscribed within the 
instrumental logic of digitization, rejection of digital technology is not an option. This 
is so not only because technological innovations, once they exit the laboratory and 
blend with society, become a constitutive part of society itself. As the critical theory 
of technology illustrates, technology is neither neutral nor equipped with ideological 
preferences on its own. The problem does not reside primarily in the tools or technol-
ogy per se, but in the influence of the capitalist ideology that makes efficiency a para-
mount value and discounts, neglects and excludes the social costs of capitalist devel-
opment and, most dramatically, the possibility that the future of society may perhaps 
be inspired by visions other than the free-market utopia (Polanyi, 1944/2001), p. 3).
An alternative strategy is that suggested by Andrew Feenberg which he de-
scribes in terms of ‘subversive rationalization’ (Feenberg, 1992): 
Constructivist and hermeneutic approaches to technology show that modern 
societies are inherently available for a different type of development in a dif-
ferent cultural framework. It is possible that, in the future, those who today are 
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subordinated to technology’s rhythms and demands will be able to control it 
and to determine its evolution. I call the process of creating such a society ‘sub-
versive rationalization’ because it requires technological advances that can only 
be made in opposition to the dominant hegemony. (Feenberg, 1992, p. 301)
Echoing the apprehension of the Frankfurt scholars (Horkheimer & Adorno, 
1969/2002; Horkheimer, 1947/2004; Marcuse, 1941/1998; Marcuse, 1964/2002), 
Feenberg exposes the beliefs ‘that technical necessity dictates the path of develop-
ment, and that the pursuit of efficiency provides a basis for identifying that path’ as 
false beliefs or ‘ideologies employed to justify restrictions on opportunities to par-
ticipate in the institutions of industrial society’. Conversely, he believes that ‘we can 
achieve a new type of technological society which can support a broader range of 
values. Democracy is one of the chief values a redesigned industrialism could better 
serve’ (Feenberg, 1992, p. 318).
The problem, however, is that even wrong beliefs can be influential and produce 
consequences affecting the competition for the control of the construction of reality. 
Discussing knowledge and temporality, for example, Robert Hassan (2003) argued 
that in the digital age, the time of the network has substituted real time with the con-
sequences of subordinating reflexive and evaluative knowledge to the ‘instrumental-
ized knowledge’ of the ‘competitive market environment’ (p. 238). The regime of the 
‘time of the network’ is established by ‘the nexus between neoliberal globalization and 
the ICT revolution’ (p. 239). 
[D]igital structures permeate the economy, culture and society to a degree 
that is historically unsurpassed, creating in the process a distinct ‘information 
ecology’. (…) In this accelerated ecology, the creation and application of reflex-
ive knowledge and reflexive evaluation becomes increasingly difficult. There is 
simply less time for it – and less perceived need for it in an increasingly com-
petitive and profit-driven social-economic system. (…) When people are ‘the 
weakest link’ in this chrono-digital ecology of our own making, then one of 
the central ironies of the information age becomes apparent. In the name of 
‘efficiency’, neoliberalism has abrogated social control to both ‘market forces’ 
and computer networks of automation. Even those ‘in control’, those in the 
boardrooms and cabinet offices of the great and powerful are essentially ‘out of 
control’ as their ‘timeframes for action’ are set in the present or the near future, 
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with the consequences of their actions (…) spiraling out into an unknown eter-
nity. We have less time to think about the future because a ‘competitive market 
environment’ compels us to think ‘fast’ and apply instrumentalized knowledge 
to the here and now. (Hassan, 2003, pp. 237-238)
In this interpretation, the digital manipulation of time affects not only the ‘speed’ 
of people’s life but also the production of knowledge, prioritizing instrumental or 
performative knowledge over evaluative, reflexive or critical knowledge. The subor-
dination of real time to the time of the network is associated with the subordination 
of knowledge to the needs of the ‘information ecology’ that generates and supports 
the network.
Questioning the role of technology, however, Feenberg claimed that democracy 
has ‘not been extended to technically mediated domains of social life despite a cen-
tury of struggle’ not because ‘technology excludes democracy’ but ‘because it has 
been used to block it’  (Feenberg, 1992, p. 320). But if technology has been used 
to block democracy, how can we ‘redesign industrialism’ so that the same technol-
ogy can serve democracy? The idea of a ‘redesigned industrialism’ that could serve 
democracy describes a desirable goal but falls short of suggesting suitable means or 
ways to get there. 
As I have suggested here, digital technology could ‘block democracy’ because in-
fluential forces managed to take advantage of its epistemic affordances to nullify ‘a 
century of struggle’ and take control of the communicative construction of reality. 
In this perspective, the invisibility of the real is a problem with an epistemic di-
mension that requires an epistemic solution: one that would allow the supporters of 
democracy to engage their enemy in the new reality. What is needed, in other words, 
is a conceptualization of the real that helps in addressing not only the invisibilities of 
the digital age but also the ideological roots of these invisibilities. Interpellation is one 
of the concepts I suggest could be usefully part of a critical framework and, with it, 
the idea that the mainstream uses of technology, e.g. in the production of subjectivi-
ties or in the re-production of society, interpellate subjects in forms that ‘make ideol-
ogy possible’: that actualize the neoliberal project into daily communicative practices.
A more radical proposal involves re-conceptualizing the social construction of 
reality in terms of a process with competitive and cooperative aspects or, more tech-
nically, in terms of the dialectics of the real. 
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tHE RE-PolItIcIZAtIon oF tHE DIgItAl AgE 
AnD tHE DIAlEctIcs oF tHE REAl 
As I argued in the beginning, in order for inequalities to be interpreted as injus-
tice, it is necessary to think of difference in relation to the distribution and legitima-
tion of power. Inequalities conceived independently from power and legitimation are 
merely differences. The problem with the double process of digitization/digitalization 
resides precisely in this decoupling.    
The invisibility of reality can be interpreted in epistemic terms as a condition in 
which the possibility of common ground in support of truth claims is both less ac-
cessible and less relevant. This epistemic condition has political consequences: con-
sequences that affect the competition for the control over the distribution of values 
in society. The fundamental aspect of these consequences is that the invisibility of the 
real supports the hegemonic structure of power by avoiding the problematization of 
inequalities in terms of knowledge and relations of power. In other words, the invis-
ibility of the real inhibits the politicization of inequalities, that is, the problematiza-
tion of differences in terms of its relation with (il)legitimate power.
From a critical perspective, the intellectual response to this condition requires an 
alternative engagement with reality or, more precisely, with the epistemic founda-
tions of this notion. 
Reality is the ground on which truth claims of some sort are possible. Without the 
possibility of truth, political behaviour is deprived of its moral dimension and com-
munication is reduced to what Jürgen Habermas called ‘strategic communication’. 
The role of reality undergoes a fundamental change: from common ground for the 
articulation of truth claims in support of moral claims and the legitimization of po-
litical action, to the self-legitimizing outcome of a form of communication in which 
the only goal is not the construction of truth but the augmentation of power. This is 
what Jean-François Lyotard called ‘performativity’ (Lyotard, 1979/1982, p. 48).
The patterns of visibility/invisibility associated with the individual, social and 
epistemic dimensions of the digital age support patterns of inequality that are con-
strued as differences rather than injustices because they are legitimized by the double 
process of digitization/digitalization and by the ideological interpellation of the sub-
jects and the relations that constitute them. 
The construction of subjectivities in a digital environment under corporate con-
trol, for example, supports a fundamental informational imbalance between the in-
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dividual on the one hand, and the state and the corporation on the other. The ‘in-
formation society’ that emerges from this imbalance is a two-strata society in which 
the power of digital elites over the digital masses is legitimized not in relation to the 
uses of this power, its social goals and effects, but in relation to an unquestioned and 
seemingly inevitable digital future and market economy. The slogan ‘program or be 
programmed’ (Rushkoff, 2010) expresses, perhaps provocatively, the idea of a radical 
polarization of political power, but it also points to its main source of legitimization: 
the control over digitization.   
Thus, the main implication of the invisibility of the real is the political invisibility 
of structural injustice: the decline in accessibility and relevance of the conditions and 
tensions through which the production of knowledge legitimizes differences while 
hiding illegitimate inequalities. 
In this perspective, the possibility of resistance to the ideological invisibility of 
structural injustice in the digital age does not reside in the rejection of the digital but 
in the preliminary re-constitution of the real or, more precisely, of its epistemological 
grounds, so to make these conditions and tensions in the production of knowledge 
and legitimation newly relevant and accessible. In practice, we need a formulation 
of the relationship between knowledge, truth and power capable of antagonizing the 
influence of capitalist interpellation in the digital age (Stocchetti, 2017).
In the technological discourse of capitalist interpellation, the construction of real-
ity is no longer a social or political process but a techno-administrative one. The digi-
tal age, in its current stage, rather than the ‘global village’, seems more likely to bring 
about global surveillance. This outcome, however, is far from inevitable and there is at 
least discursive evidence that the legitimization of this transformation is problematic. 
The slogan, ‘the virtual is the new real’, for example, is an ideological incitation similar 
to that ‘the king is dead, long live the king!’. It seeks legitimization through continuity: 
the legitimization of the ‘new real’ by representing the transition from the ‘old real’ 
as a natural transition. Like all ideological slogans, also this one hides its ideological 
function: the legitimation of the virtual as the new real since, in fact, the ‘virtual’ is 
not the ‘real’. It also hides the fact that this transition is far from a ‘natural’ process but 
very much a political one: a process in which material and immaterial resources are 
used by identifiable actors in the competition for control of the social construction 
of reality. 
If, as Feenberg suggested, we need to redirect the role of technology from block-
ing democracy to supporting it, we need a ground to resist the effects of capital-
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ist interpellation in the digital age. We need to re-deploy the construction of reality 
on epistemological grounds in ways that can help the recovery of the emancipative 
potential of the idea that ‘reality is what we make of it’. A proper discussion of the 
epistemological features of such grounds would require an engagement with critical 
realism and social constructionism that is not possible here. Within the limits of this 
paper, I will thus confine myself to the problem of digital invisibilities and the influ-
ence of capitalist interpellation on the social production of reality in the digital age.
The main idea of this approach is that what we usually call reality is an impermanent 
result of a complex and multidimensional process through which people, groups and 
institutions manage to give a temporary solution to opposing tensions. This process 
contains competitive and non-competitive aspects and is based on communicative and 
non-communicative practices. The same process, however, has a political dimension 
to the extent that the specific solutions to opposing tensions have implications for the 
competition for control of the distribution of values in society or, as Harold D. Lasswell 
puts it, the question of ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell, 1936/1950).
The awareness that the construction of reality is a dialectical process with a po-
litical dimension and political consequences is the first step for the re-politicization 
of the real. This process stands, so to say, on two legs: first, the rejection of capitalist 
interpellation and influence on the digitalization of society; and, second, the pro-
duction of ideological formulations capable of expressing alternative technological 
interpellation in support of more emancipative representations of the ‘imaginary re-
lationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’.
The idea that reality is the impermanent result of dialectical tensions has two im-
plications. First, it makes visible the influence of non-hegemonic social forces and 
ideologies, thus opening the possibility of political mobilization and anti-hegemonic 
coalition at both levels of policies and politics. Second, it performs descriptive and 
prescriptive functions: it tells something about how this process works and what its 
participants should keep in mind if they want to be influential. Behind this idea and 
these two implications is the fact that the social construction of reality does not take 
place in a vacuum but in a social environment populated by a rich variety of rela-
tions, ideas, visions, histories, hidden and overt conflicts, regularities, paradoxes, etc. 
The interpretation of reality as the result of a linear or even incremental process per-
formed by ‘structures’ in a politically or ideologically neutral environment (e.g. the 
digital environment) is itself an ideological artefact to hide, naturalize and legitimize 
the influence of a hegemonic ideology in the social construction of reality. 
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The dialectics of the real involve a complex interplay of the material and im-
material dimensions. One important step to counter the influence of capitalist 
digitalization is to re-evaluate the material dimension of political power and to 
consider the possibility that ideological manipulation may be accountable for 
overrating the subversive potential of the digital. As I argued elsewhere, in re-
lation to the role of digital visuality (Stocchetti, 2014), the effective exercise of 
political power requires solid connections to the material dimension of politi-
cal struggle. More generally, the emphasis on the ‘subversive potential’ of digi-
tal communication may make people forget that the legal systems of democratic 
regimes still offer powerful tools to address and inhibit the transformation of 
(digital) invisibility into (digital) inequality and (digital) injustice. The approach 
of critical political economy of the media (Hardy, 2014) is most useful to engage 
with the material grounds of capitalist interpellation of digitalization and the 
possibility of reducing corporate control of the digital infrastructure. We should 
however keep in mind that the legal system and political economy are also arenas 
of political struggle: places of institutional confrontation between social forces 
associated with or antagonistic of the capitalist control of digitalization. The role 
of the institutional dimensions and of institutions as both tools or resources and 
arenas of political struggle is also an influential dimension of the dialectics of the 
real whose importance should not be overshadowed, for example, by the alleged 
influence of online activism.
The political relevance of online activism, and its limits, are defined by the ex-
tent this form of communication can (or cannot!) influence and support or under-
mine the possibility of successful redistribution of power in society. The digitaliza-
tion of political activism both aggregates and isolates political dissidence, creating 
communicative micro-cosmos in the form of eco-chambers or filter-bubbles with 
problematic effects on the capacity of democratic regimes to handle social change. 
These micro-cosmos facilitate the survival of groups and political movements too 
radical to get enough acknowledgment offline, and are instrumental to the control 
of resources that may eventually support activism offline. The construction of an 
ideological and more democratic alternative to the capitalist digital interpellation 
requires a critical reflection on the relative advantages and disadvantages of digital 
activism. To the extent that democracy flourishes on the confrontation of different 
opinions, for example, it is important to understand if and when the internet can 
facilitate or hamper democratic communication and the formation of democratic 
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subjectivities (see e.g., Dahlberg, 2011). Taking this argument further, we may even 
question the suitability of online activism where the goals are to foster awareness of 
the detrimental effects of digital isolation on democratic politics. 
subvERsIvE RAtIonAlIZAtIon AnD cRItIcAl MEDIA lItERAcY
The points I have discussed in this paper are compatible with and inspired by, 
among other sources, Feenberg’s idea that ‘the dominant model of industrial society 
is politically contingent’, and by his appeal to ‘subversive rationalization’ (Feenberg, 
1992, p. 301). In this concluding section, I would like to go one step further and 
suggest how professional educators may contribute to ‘subversive rationalization’ in 
media education. 
The capitalist appropriation of the ‘digital turn’ in education, far from being a ‘rev-
olution’, consists mostly of a change in which educational and pedagogical content 
and relations are re-inscribed within the limits or ‘affordances’ of new technologies 
and, what is most disturbing, of an inescapable ‘digital future’. Digital capitalism seeks 
to preserve itself by taking root in education, by establishing a ‘digital pedagogy’ that 
could form individuals compliant with the invisibilities of the digital age and the in-
justices associated with it, in the same ways as we are accustomed to the differences 
and injustices that the natural world and luck, or lack of thereof, impose on us. In 
the past decade or so, these efforts have been met with growing resistance, and the 
increasing influence of critical studies in education, pedagogy and technology testify 
that the efforts to preserve the grip on capitalist interpellation on technological devel-
opment are met with resistance. 
If reality is construed as an impermanent outcome of dialectical tensions, we need 
to appreciate the ideological and socio-political role of education. This role cannot 
be overestimated, and the influence of capitalist interpellation on the digitalization 
of education reveals the fundamental importance of this institution in the re-pro-
duction of reality. The idea that reality is the result of the temporary resolution of 
dialectical tensions may support a critical epistemology but remains quite sterile on 
ideological grounds if democratic education fails to give people the means and the 
will to participate in the construction of reality, that is, to reclaim the sovereignty 
expropriated by the capitalist interpellation. Put simply, we need individuals who 
are able to take advantage of whatever opportunities these critical epistemological 
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grounds may offer in support of the re-politicization of the real. How to form this 
kind of individuals is a problem that has to do with pedagogy, or the formation of in-
dividuals, more than with education and professional training, if these two activities 
are interpreted in the restrictive terms of the transmission of competences. It is not 
only a matter of what kind of competences or ‘knowledge’ are required in the digital 
age, but of the ideals or ‘ethics’ associated with its present and future. In this perspec-
tive, as I argued elsewhere (Stocchetti, 2017a), the effective challenge to the capitalist 
appropriation of digital technology requires the formation of individuals or personae 
willing and able to engage in the social construction of reality as a dialectical process 
and in support of emancipative values. 
The introduction of media literacy in media education curricula falls dramatically 
short of this goal. What is needed, instead, is a more radical approach to media edu-
cation that I would like to refer to here as critical media literacy.  
Media literacy is obviously not enough if this notion is interpreted as the mere 
acquisition of competences that are supposedly necessary for the participation of the 
individual in the media and information order of digital capitalism. Learning to use 
digital media is important and it appears as difficult today as learning to read and 
write must have appeared difficult to most in the 16th century. That alone, however, 
is not enough because the formation of digital subjectivities combines with capitalist 
interpellation and, given ideological control of technological development, the pro-
cess of socialization in the digital age participates in the socialization of the capitalist 
social order. If the goal is to challenge the capitalist appropriation of technological 
development and oppose the injustices associated with it, media education should 
engage with ideological interpellation and the legitimization of power relations. 
Unfortunately, even in most authoritative and perhaps influential expressions as, 
for example, the draft version of the Paris Declaration on Media and Information Lit-
eracy in the Digital Age1, media literacy is construed as the acquisition of competence 
that, while inspired by laudable values, seems to ignore actual power relations (e.g. 
corporate power) and the possibility of futures radically different from the present. 
Critical media literacy is the term for an approach to media education that is in 
many respects still a work in progress and, although useful formulations are avail-
able (e.g., Kellner & Share, 2007; Hammer, 2011; Mason, 2016; Nam, 2010), is still 
underdeveloped. 
Media literacy puts the emphasis on the capacity to use available technology but 
1  http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/news/paris_mil_declaration.pdf
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do not problematizes the ideological dimension and the legitimation of relations of 
power. In this approach, ‘critical’ competence is a generic capacity to have an opinion 
and make rational choices. In critical media literacy instead, the core competence is 
to identify the nature of the forces that seek to influence our choices and the grounds 
on which these forces justify their influence. Inherent in this notion is the idea that, 
in order to bring about the ‘subversion’ sought by Feenberg, media education, and 
perhaps formal education in general, can be usefully inspired by the critical pedagogy 
of Paulo Freire and others. 
A core goal of this pedagogy is critical consciousness, and the possibility to enable 
learners to identify relations of power and to assess their legitimacy, or the grounds 
of their justification (Freire, 1974/2013; Freire, 1998/2001). Applied to critical media 
literacy, this goal consists in the capacity to engage with media in problematizing the 
role of ideological interpellation, digital technology and the media themselves within 
the broader context of the social construction of reality and the tensions I have here 
discussed in the terms of the dialectics of the real.  
More precisely, the capacity to assess the nature of power relations, the grounds 
for their legitimacy, is a pre-requisite to the choice of compliance or resistance, which 
are in essence moral choices. In relation to the invisibilities of the digital age, critical 
media literacy consists in the acquisition of the capacity to identify and assess the 
nature and especially the legitimacy of the power relations associated with the digi-
talization of society. This competence is key to recognizing invisibilities and to dis-
tinguishing those that are constitutive of injustice from those who merely represent 
difference. From this perspective, the critical theory of technology is an important 
element in the formation of the critical media literacy curriculum, especially for edu-
cators. In other words, where media literacy is inspired by a pedagogical model that 
seeks individual ‘adaptation’, critical media literacy pursue the ideal of ‘integration’. 
The difference, as Freire put it, is crucial:  
Integration with one’s context, as distinguished from adaptation, is a distinc-
tively human activity. Integration results from the capacity to adapt oneself to 
reality plus the critical capacity to make choices and to transform reality. To the 
extent that man loses his ability to make choices and is subjected to the choices 
of others, to the extent that his decisions are no longer his own because they 
result from external prescriptions, he is no longer integrated. Rather, he has 
adapted. He has “adjusted”. Unpliant men, with a revolutionary spirit, are often 
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termed “maladjusted”. The integrated person is person as Subject. In contrast, 
the adaptive person is person as object, adaptation representing at most a weak 
form of self-defence. If man is incapable of changing reality, he adjusts himself 
instead. Adaptation is behaviour characteristic of the animal sphere; exhibited 
by man, it is symptomatic of his dehumanization. Throughout history men have 
attempted to overcome the factors which make them accommodate or adjust, in 
a struggle – constantly threatened by suppression – to attain their full humanity. 
(Freire, 1974/2013, p. 4) (Italics in the original)
Thus, the re-politicization of the social construction of reality requires that formal 
education provides critical media literacy, instead of mere media literacy, because the 
problem is not merely one of learning to use to the digital media but of subverting the 
illegitimate relations of power that capitalist digitalization seeks to hide and natural-
ize. Actual emancipation requires individuals to effectively engage and oppose the 
influence of capitalist interpellation on digital technology – in other words, refusing 
to be ‘prosumers’ and instead enforcing their rights as citizens.
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